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Abstract
IT security outsourcing is the establishment of a contractual relationship between an organization with
an outside vendor which assumes responsibility for the organisation’s security functions. Outsourcing in
IS has had a variable history of success and the complexity of the decision making process leads to a
substantial degree of uncertainty. This is especially so in the realm of IS security since the protection of
both hardware and software systems is placed in the hands of an external provider. This paper is a fuller
and more comprehensive paper of a previous paper outlining the effectiveness of the decision making
process by means of a conceptual model using Soft System Methodology techniques that integrates
security benefits, costs and their respective performance measures. In this paper the methodology used to
develop the model is discussed in detail.
Keywords
Information Security, Outsourcing and Conceptual Model.

INTRODUCTION
The concept of outsourcing Information Systems is not new and the concept has been covered at length
in the literature over the last two decades. Outsourcing system security is a more recent phenomenon
and derived its impetus from the explosive growth in interactive computing during the 1990s when the
use of proprietary networks gave way to the Internet as a vehicle of data transport. The academic origin
of the development of the Internet and the trust existing amongst its early users seemed to abrogate the
need for rigorous security and the consequent design was therefore deficient in this regard. However,
during the 1990s when it became available for commercial use, the need for more scrupulous security
became apparent even though it was an area of concern not taken seriously by many businesses until
sometime later. During the last ten years or so, however, the focus has become increasingly acute as the
scope of business, social and governmental activities has driven the worldwide physical
telecommunication networks, and the World Wide Web (WWW) that provides its interface, to
unprecedented levels. Ecommerce has become an accepted channel for the great majority of large
businesses and SMEs are adopting it in increasing numbers. In addition, organisations are increasingly
looking offshore as a means of minimising IT service costs and related taxes.
Security outsourcing is an option not only for established businesses, but also for startup organisations
and those entering new lines of business. For established businesses, security outsourcing is
economically driven. For startup organisations or startup market operations, there is the potential of
time minimization by contracting an outsourcing organisation to provide those services immediately
(CICA 2003). Much of has been written about outsourcing as a management tool (Burnett, 1998, James
and White 1996, Johnson, 1997) but less has been written about the ethical issues. This paper presents a
perspective by means of a case study based upon the Soft Systems Methodology (SSM) of the concerns
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that organisations address when considering IT security outsourcing as an option. It is intended to
address the benefits and challenges of security outsourcing aiding in the development of a conceptual
model that will improve decision making for management when they make or examine outsourcing
decisions.

OUTSOURCING
The history of outsourcing of IT, which commenced in 1989 with Kodak (Loh and Venkatraman, 2002),
has been thoroughly documented and, increasingly, organisations are considering outsourcing of their
information systems activities as an attractive option. IS outsourcing has, in fact, experienced a
considerable growth in recent years as reported in Baldwing et al. (2001), Bryce and Useem, (1998),
Caldwell, (1996), Currie (2000), Heeks et al. (2001), Kern et al. (2002), Lacity and Willcocks (1998),
Marchand and Jacobsen (2001), McLellan et al. (1995), Palvia (1995), Shepherd (1999) and Udo
(2000). The outsourcing of security is, however, a relatively recent phenomenon. Blacharski (2000)
states that “as more enterprises turn to ecommerce as a predominant business model and open their
networks to customers and business partners, security auditing, monitoring, intrusion detection, and
firewalls become even more necessary to protect the network against hacks, viruses, and other security
breaches” Faile (2001) indicates that security of an organisation’s assets may be achieved by
maintaining functions inhouse, engaging external providers to perform all security related tasks, or a
variable combination. On a general level, Duncan (1998) in referring to the theories of Transaction Cost
Analysis (TCA) (Williamson, 1975, 1985) and Resource Based Theory (RBT) (Prahalad and Hamel,
1990, Barney, 1986), quotes three factors that “dominate approaches to the problem of which IT
resources can and should be outsourced, IT resource characteristics, transaction types, and risk”.
Whereas outsourcing security does not equate to outsourcing IT, it may be argued that each of these
also favour the outsourcing of security, but particularly the latter two are of interest. The notion of the
transaction in Williamson’s terms is the“hierarchy” in that it is more economic to maintain the source
of the transaction inhouse, or the “market” in that it is more economic to buy in the service from the
market. Both academics (Gurbaxani,1996) and practitioners (Blacharski, 2000; Hulme, 2001, Brenner,
2004) maintain that the primary reasons for outsourcing IT are cost containment and acquisition of
expertise. Blacharski (2000) offers evidence of a “dramatic” cost differential between in-house and
outsourced security operations in addition to the potential of a comparatively poor in-house operation
due to critical security task omission. In regards to the risk factor, Koch (2005) analyses risk from the
viewpoint of perception in defining the acceptable level. But high profile cases such as the Pentagon
Hacker (Ballard, 2006) and Card Systems credit card breach (Sahadi, 2005) have had a risk awareness
impact upon many organisations. It is apparent, therefore that the notion of security outsourcing has
come of age, indeed, Schneier (in Brenner, 2004) predicts that “network security will largely be
outsourced by 2010 regardless of compliance issue, and infrastructure is always outsourced”.

DESCRIPTION OF SSM
SSM was developed in the 1970s, and refined during the 1980s, because of Checkland’s recognition
that the hard system methodologies prevalent in Operations Research at the time were illequipped to
deal with realworld organizational problems. The human context of these problems rendered them
both unstructured and unrestricted and nonamenable to experimentation (Mingers, 2000). Rose (1997)
considers that “SSM is variously characterized by Checkland as a `system of enquiry', `enquiry process',
`learning system', `reflection in action', `an organized version of doing purposeful thinking', `structured
way of thinking' (Checkland and Scholes, 1990)”. The initial SSM was a seven stage methodology which
dichotomised real world and systems thinking. Real world thinking was essential since as Checkland
(1981) stated that “human beings can always attach different meanings to the same social world”. The
early stages involve themselves with defining and explaining the problem situation absorbing the
pluralism of stakeholder perceptions. A formal process of model construction ensues in stages three and
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four which are concerned with Root Definitions (RD) and Conceptual Models (CM). An RD for each
stakeholder is a statement incorporating the underlying beliefs about the system’s purpose within
his/her particular worldview and the CM is a schematic representing the set of system activities and
their relationships that must be performed to satisfy the stockholder’s perspective. The CM is an
intellectual model that includes the emergent properties of the system but is unconcerned how the set of
system activities might be implemented in the real world. Stages five and six compare the conceptual
model with the real world to identify potential changes in the real world. Mismatches are classified as
problems rather than symptoms (Eva, 2004; Platt and Warwick, 1995). Finally stage seven implements
recommendations for change and the cyclical nature of SSM causes the modification of the problem
situation.
SSM has been subject to continuous refinement. Mingers (2000) discusses developments such as the
concepts of effectiveness, efficacy, and efficiency as tools for monitoring and control (Checkland et al.,
1990), the use of metaphor and pictures in developing RDs (Atkinson and Checkland, 1988); and a
refinement of concepts, e.g., Weltanschauung (Checkland and Davies, 1986) and holon (Checkland,
1988).
Whereas the philosophical stance of SSM as a research paradigm is still being debated (Rose, 1997), it
has made a substantial impact in the field of qualitative enquiry and that this has been its area of
particular strength (Crowe et al, 1996, Checkland, 2000). Checkland was concerned with the
relationship between soft system and classical research methodologies which dealt with relatively
simple and well structured systems. Problems in the human domain by contrast involved the
consideration of social, political, and historical aspects and demonstrate a complexity and lack of
structure that reductionist, classical analysis techniques ignore. The ‘sense making’ of this complexity
is achieved by a learning process which is subject to interpretation. Indeed, Holwell (2000), affirms that
interpretivism is an attribute of particular strength in SSM. The strength of the interpretation is
dependant, therefore, on the quality of the subjectivity (Avison, 1989; Benyon and Skidmore, 1987;
Cavaleri, 1994; Crowe et al., 1996) that is responsible for it. Holwell explores this and mentions the
associated themes of the concern with meaning (Burrell, 1983; Feng, 1993; Romm, 1995), the emphasis
on understanding the problemsituation in the fullest way (Avison and WoodHarper, 1991; Harry,
1994; Mason and Willcocks, 1994;), that SSM is a holistic approach (Anderson, 1989; Jackson, 1982;
Mingers and Taylor, 1992), and that its concern and outcome are learning (Brown, 1992; Lyytinen,
1988; Mathiassen et al., 1991) or sense making (Lyytinen, 1992). (Holwell, 2000, p785). Rose (1997)
asserts that “SSM's grasp of the use of systems concepts as epistemological devices for achieving
knowledge of the world also seems secureat least in its exponents' writing about it”,

WHY SSM
Having briefly examined the reasons that security or indeed any system is outsourced as outlined in the
literature, and the value of SSM in examining the human dimensions of systems, we need to justify the
value of applying SSM to the question of outsourcing. The support of security outsourcing from the
body of practitioners is substantial as has been shown in the preceding section. Costs and staffing are
the principle concerns. But whereas IS outsourcing has been a matter of academic concern within the
academic community, at this stage security outsourcing has not enjoyed that prominence. SSM affords
an opportunity to provide a fresh perspective from two viewpoints. The first concerns the SSM
methodology of building a conceptual model from the plural perspectives of a number of practitioners
and comparing it with the real world situation or at least its perception. The second is that in providing
a plural view we are extending the SSM practice of a single model for each stakeholder to a combined
view with the intent of providing a generalized model. Clearly this is a qualitative exercise and the
following section expands upon the nature of qualitative research.

3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The nature of research into the human perspectives of phenomena is clearly quantitative. Cresswell
(1994) defines a qualitative study “ as an inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem,
based on building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of informants,
and conducted in a natural setting”. The two main concepts to emerge from this definition are the
complex nature of the social problems that the research is addressing and the natural or contextual
setting. A similar but more detailed definition comes from Denzin and Lincoln (1994) which also
includes the type of data that is collected in a qualitative enquiry
“Qualitative research is multi-method in focus, involving an interpretive, naturalistic approach
to its subject matter. This means that qualitative researchers study things in their natural
settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people
bring to them. Qualitative research involves the studied use and collection of a variety of
empirical materials, case study, personal experience, introspective, life story interview,
observational, historical, interactional, and visual texts-that describe routine and problematic
moments and meaning in individuals' lives.”
The issue of complexity is further explored by Stake (1995) who considers that “research questions
typically orient to case or phenomena seeking pattens of unanticipated as well as expected relationships”
(p41). In this view, the independent variables are experiential, are unknown and uncontrolled, and may
therefore develop unpredictably throughout the study. Further complexity occurs since the phenomena
are linked through a myriad of coincidental circumstances in an environment of “spatial, historical,
political, economic cultural, social and personal” (p43) significance. Since reality is personally and
independently constructed each case is both common and unique. The phenomenon subject to research
may be common to all stakeholders, but each accommodates a unique reality. So how is the researcher
to unravel this social complexity? Essentially, qualitative researchers are noninterventionist (Stake,
1995). But since the ‘truths’ that they seek are embedded in human and social interaction, researchers
must, as part of the investigation, involve themselves in the social setting to appreciate the participants’
perspective (Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991).
A further focus on the case study is the unit of analysis which in some way must be bounded or
delimited to concentrate the study. The notion of ‘boundedness’ is referred to by many authors, for
example, the ‘integrated system’ (Stake, 1994), the ‘bounded system’ (Smith, 1978) and) the ‘bounded
context’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Merriam (1997) considers that the delimitation of the unit of
study is the single most defining characteristic. In this view, a case or phenomenon is by definition
intrinsically bounded. A calculated guide to ‘boundedness’ is to assess limits to potential interviewees
or observations. If no actual or theoretical limits exist, neither does the case. In our case, the
’boundedness’ is theoretical in that the unit of analysis is the notion of the outsourcing of security. Both
these concepts, outsourcing and security, have been discussed earlier in this paper and are clearly
identifiable phenomena in their own terms and together form a comprehensive and bounded case.
However, the development of the case in the theoretical context has similarities to the development of a
conceptual framework. There are two aspects to this in the current situation. Firstly, from the viewpoint
of the case itself, both the content and boundaries are notional (as discussed above) and as such subject
to debate. Secondly, the content and the boundaries will both emerge and evolve as a case development
proceeds and become intertwined with the theoretical construct that is the model itself. The model in
its final form therefore should be generalisable and predictive.
Synergistic with the concepts of SSM, which involves the perceptions of the stakeholders, we used a
methodology that both involved and enfranchised the organisation and its senior staff. This allowed the
theory and knowledge about the decisionmaking process for IT security outsourcing to be understood,
and the development of an effective model for assessing the costs and security risks associated with
adopting an outsourcing strategy. The case is an appropriate research strategy to collect qualitative data
from interviews, verbal reports and the unobtrusive observation of primary data sources (Bonoma
(1985). However, an important development of the case also links to the notion of the conceptual
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framework, is the concept of ‘structured case’ (Carroll and Swatman, 2000). Eisenhardt (1989) refers to
the conceptual framework as theory and this has three roles in qualitative research; to guide the
research design and data collection, to facilitate iteration in data collection and analysis, and to feature
as part of the research outcome. Input to the conceptual framework is multifaceted. Reichel and Ramey
(1987) describe a conceptual framework as a set of broad ideas and principles taken from relevant fields
of enquiry and used to structure a subsequent presentation. Maxwell (2004) itemises personal
experience, existing theory and prior research, exploratory and pilot research, thought experiments, and
preliminary data and conclusions as components. Anderson and Aydin (1994) view the developed
theory as subscribed by Guba and Lincoln (1989) to be the principle outcome of the process. In this
case, the conceptual framework should function not as a constraint but rather be developed into relevant
theory, hypotheses, and concepts. The structured case concept absorbs this into case development and is
an eminently suitable vehicle for this research, which is to build theory and knowledge of the IT
security outsourcing process in organisations from studying a number of Australian business
environments. The name structuredcase refers to:
•

the formal structures (framework and research cycle) that will be used to guide the research
team in the process of building a theory; these structures make the process visible, document
its dynamics and so demonstrate how the theory is grounded in the collated field data.

•

the case as the unit of study: any single, bounded and unique system (Stake, 1994) which is the
subject of field work; case is used in this general sense rather than the specific case study
research strategy. Thus, structuredcase can be applied to any field research, which we see as
defined by “... the physical situation of the research: it takes place in the everyday context of
the phenomena being studied” (Carroll et al., 1998).

The research method is illustrated in Figure 1, and its main elements and their relevance to case study
research. The research cycle will be used to expand, enrich, validate and revise the developed
framework.

Research themes
Literature
Insights
Theoretical
Foundations

Framework

Reflect

Theory and
knowledge to
develop new tools
and techniques

Plan

Analyse

Collect
data

Figure 1 The Structured Case Research Method (Adapted from Carroll and Swatman, 2000)
The focus group used for the case study was a professional body of Information Security Managers in
Western Australia, these managers are involved in the management of large, medium and small sized
organisations. The research was broken down into the following steps:
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a.

Initial Interviews and surveys to determine views in regards to outsourcing;

b.

First Focus Group meeting to determine key issues and concerns;

c.

Development of Conceptual model;

d.

Second Focus Group Meeting to validate the Conceptual model.

The remainder of this paper is devoted to the construction of the conceptual model and its testing so far
as it has progressed.

DERIVATION OF MODEL
This section discusses the development of the model as detailed in 5c above. The major principles
involved in its emergence were the guidance that the SSM methodology afforded and the reflection and
interpretation that the data was subjected to, both of which are consistent with the structured case
methodology. The model was developed in a number of steps in accordance with the SSM focus and
was:
a.

Step1 Guided Data Collection

b.

Step2 Data Refinement

c.

Step3 Root definitions

d.

Derivation of the Model

Each is discussed in turn.
a.

Guided Data Collection

Since the modelling technique is based upon SSM the type of questions reflect the CATWOE
philosophy. Checkland uses mnemonic CATWOE to describe the human activity and its situation, and
it is reproduced below to purposes of clarity.
•

C:

Customer: the beneficiary of the business system.

•

A:

Actor: the people who perform the tasks in the system.

•

T:
Transformation: the core activity of the system, or the primary change brought about
as a result.

•

W:
Weltanschauung (or worldview): the underlying belief about the system, whether it is
the priority, the type of system or the objective of the system.

•

O:

•

E:
Environment: the factors outside the system that might impose constraints on how it
operates, e.g. legal or regulatory rulings, business environment, workload etc.
(Eva, 2004)

Owner: the person or body that has the power to approve/cancel the system.

Two predominant issues arise from the discussion so far. The first is that part of the problem expression
is identifying the parties involved and so this is not only reflected in the demography of the
interviewees and focus groups, but also whom they consider to be stakeholders in the process. The
second relates to the W or worldview.
“World-views must be declared and debated: the same activity performed by people who are
unanimous in their opinion that the activity is useful and merits improvement can be motivated
by quite different reasons for its worth. The disagreements may be unimportant while the
activity is in a steady state, but may be crucial barriers to the search for improvement.”
(Hindle and Braithwaite 2001, p35)
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The concept of ‘understanding’ is also an important component of the worldview if the model is to be
useful in the broader context.
The questions used and their context is shown in Figure 2.
What viewpoint are
you taking to give
your answers?
Perspective

Who should stop
the outsourcing
function if it is not
working?

Who should run
such a system?
Operate
Control

Who are the beneficiaries
of an outsourced
information security
system?
Benefit

Outsourced
Security System
Functions

What are the main
tasks such a system
should perform?

Constraints

Metrics

What constraints
should there be on
such a system?

How would you
measure the
system?

Figure2: Soft Systems Approach to an Outsourced Security System
The questions are shown in the boxes and can be subdivided into three types. Firstly, above the
horizontal bracket is a question that yields only metadata in that it reveals the vantage point from which
the contributor is viewing the system. It yields no data about the system itself. Secondly, those
questions above the central box and below the horizontal bracket identify the human element, those in
control, those who operate and those who benefit from the system. Clearly the terms superimposed on
the arrows nominate the relationship between participant and system. Thirdly, the boxes below the
central box show those questions that relate to the system itself and identify the functions, constraints
and metrics of the system. Congruent with the philosophy of SSM the comments that result from these
comments are idealistic, that is, they relate to the participants’ perceived notion of a flawless and
consummate system.
The relationships between the questions and the CATWOE analysis are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. CATWOE Analysis

Traditional CATWOE
Customer/Client
Actor
Transformation
World View
Owner
Environment
b.

Case Study Equivalent
Beneficiaries
Operations
Functions/Metrics
(Perception)
Control
Constraints

Data Refinement

7

The equivalence, as it turned out, is not precise. The world view is was not well reflected in the
responses to the perception question and in real life there is little point in stating, and eventually
implementing, potential system functions if they cannot be measured. But metrics do not appear in the
CATWOE analysis. Nevertheless they appear in the model as outlined in section Moreover, the data
that emerged from the six questions was extremely rich and was subjected to some rigorous, if intuitive,
analysis to classify and rationalize it. From this analysis it was possible to build the root definitions. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to describe the analysis of all areas in detail. However, it is instructive
to examine part of it prior to stating the root definitions so as to convey the complexity of the process.
Appendix 1 contains the complete list of responses to the question “What are the main tasks such a
system should perform?” It is immediately apparent that although some answers figuratively answer the
question and the response is coherent, it conveys no sense of functionality. For example, the response
that the system should ‘save time’ refers to the efficiency of the potential system, and therefore is an
attribute but not a function. The first part of the analysis in this case was, therefore, to identify the
attributes and of the 45 responses to the question, therefore, 18 may be identified as attributes and 26 as
functions. One defied either classification. However, a second pass of both attributes and functions
attempted to identify the subject of the response and this yielded a rich variety of themes. The greater
number of attributes themes related to the administration of the system (administer efficiently), the
efficient operation of the system (efficiency), other extraneous requirements such as a toolset
(functional requirements), the system’s resistance to attack, etc. (robustness) and finally a set of non
functional requirements emerged which have been termed ‘objectives’. Taken together these constitute a
set of policy requirements and as such suggest themselves as transformation candidates in a particular
form of root definition. This is shown in Table 2.
The functional requirements were subjected to a similar second pass to classify subjects and this proved
very fruitful in identifying transformations in the more traditional sense. These have been included in a
second root definition which has a functional flavour. The third level of analysis was intended as further
refinement but has not yet been used in model building. The nature of this classification has been both
intuitive and rigorous. The intuitive aspect is typical in the interpretation of qualitative data and is
accepted as such. But the resultant classifications must be sufficiently robust to construct a model that
will withstand the participants’ feedback and prove useful. Indications at this stage are favourable.
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Root Definitions
The root definitions that have been derived are shown in Tables 2 and 3:
Table 2 Policy Root Definition

Root Definition Clause
A system owned by the organization,
operated by the outsourcer and organisational security and
administrative management, and security operatives
to benefit the organisation and its parts, the system users and
the public by
minimising risk through the implementation of a security
policy and practice and so improve the current security
situation, evaluate and defend against threats, protect data
systems, allow internal staff to concentrate on strategic goals
and produce information for management decisions
in a hostile and vulnerable computing environment and
specialised services to protect against it and
constrained by organisational policy, contractual and service
requirements, and cost effectiveness.

CATWOE/OSS
Owner/control
Actors/Operators
Clients/Benefit
Transformation/ Function

Worldview
Environment: constraints

Table 3 Functional Root Definition

Root Definition Clause
A system owned by the organisation and
operated by the outsourcer, and suitably qualified, skilled,
and positioned company personnel
to control access, prevent intrusion, maintain environmental
surveillance, record and analyse hostile events, manage data,
produce appropriate reports and protect itself by backup
procedures
for the benefit of the organisation and its parts, the system
users and the public
in an environment of increased efficiency, superior expertise,
defined guidelines and objectives, and
constrained by organisational policy, contractual and service
requirements, and cost effectiveness.
c.

CATWOE/OSS
Owner/control
Actors/Operators
Clients/Benefit

Transformation/ Function
Worldview
Environment: constraints

Model Construction

In SSM the classical model is a bounded part of a wider system with which it interacts. The essential
components of such a model include the mission, the decision making process and some measure of
performance. The interaction of these components with each other is such that the effects and actions
are diffused throughout the system in a wider world constructed from personal ideas and perceptions.
The outsourcing model is shown in Figure 3
In accordance with the SSM model precepts outlined above the model contains the objective (mission),
the actions and their targets (decision making processes) and the metrics by which performance will be
measured. In the larger circle the actions are derived from the Root Definitions and are split into policy
(the top ellipse) and functions (the lower ellipse). In the upper ellipse, the ring type connectivity is
intended to demonstrate the integrated nature of the policy objectives but their high level nature as
stated within the data may translate into any number of unspecified actions. However, the data did yield
a number of much more specific actions as is shown in the lower ellipse, but the connectivity is not so
clear as in fact is shown in section e) validation. The major actions of control access, prevent intrusion
and maintain surveillance are mainstream and clearly connected as activities of a similar level, and the
latter subsumes the recording and analysis of hostile events and the production of appropriate reports.
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The remaining activities, managing data and selfprotection via backup, might be regarded as
peripheral and this is reflected by the lack of connectivity.

Figure 3 The Outsourcing Security Model
The targets and metrics have been composed from the responses to the functions, constraints and
metrics questions. As already noted, responses were wide ranging and imprecise when responding to
questions and so much of the data was freeflowing requiring a considerable depth of analysis.
d.

Model validation

The model was dispatched to the original participants with a series of five questions. Unfortunately
only five responses were returned but have been analysed in the following sections:
i. The general consensus to the question “Are your views as expressed at the interview included
the model?” was affirmative with the exception of one of the respondents. One respondent
commented on the broader than expected scope of the model and another considered that from a
confidence point of view, more emphasis should have been placed on the nature of the
relationship between system owners and the outsource service providers, for example, audit trails
and performance indicators. The same respondent commented that bubble 9, ‘Record and analyse
hostile events’ “ should be more inclusive of the concept of preventing hostile events, not just
recording them and analysing them after they have happened”.
ii. In regard to the question “ Do you regard the tasks in the model feasible?” again the general
consensus was agreement. But cautionary comments included, firstly, a degree of confusion
between tasks and goals/objectives and their relationships and, secondly, a concern that “strategy
should be determined prior to policy – but perhaps listed order is not reflective of chronological
order”.
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iii. Responses to the question “ Do you regard the tasks in the model desirable?” were qualified.
One respondent found difficulty with the model that covered both tasks and objectives. Otherwise
opinions covered a range that all tasks were minimally necessary to provide protection, that the
tasks were necessary but not exhaustive and that some tasks, notably, data management and
disaster recovery may not be appropriate in every organization.
iv. The responses to the question “Is there anything that could be added to or taken away from the
model to make the system any more effective or efficient?” arguably provided the most valuable
feedback to the model. One respondent was concerned with the notion of efficiency in that it was
mentioned several times but was divorced from the usual connotations of “overall systems
efficiency (in) say hardware or OS or application tuning”. This dichotomy was intended, but the
response impinges upon the assessment of risk. The complete comment which includes the
context of the above is that “security events can impact on system efficiency, but would be less
likely to occur and less important to overall systems efficiency than say hardware or OS or
application tuning”. As discussed above, the impact of a security breach may be devastating but
its infrequency may have a falsely reassuring effect. A second observant response involved the
connectivity of the ellipses numbered 711 in the main task circle. The tasks were derived from
the initial responses and the connectivity was a logical if subjective construct from then
researchers. However, the model as shown has not at this stage been reconstructed as in inherent
in the cyclical nature of SSM. Clearly modifications still require to be made. The final relevant
comment to this question was the lack of interface between system owners and outsourcers as was
mentioned by the same respondent in question 1 above. The issues of the SLAs and builtin
alarms were specifically mentioned as deficient in the model.
v. The final question invited comments about the model. One favourable and unqualified response
was that “it would certainly accomplish the objective” but another considered that a clearer
definition was required. A third along similar lines considered that the model were reconfigured
to show objectives and targets on the opposite side of the page which would better present it as
solutions driven.

CONCLUSION

Since the validation data is relatively sparse we combine the discussion with the conclusions. The
objective of the research is to provide a fresh perspective on the nature of security outsourcing which
has been only lightly covered in the academic literature. The notion of seizing upon SSM as a learning
methodology coincided with the desire to involve a number of practitioner viewpoints in an iterative
study which combined those viewpoints with a formal modeling technique. The extension to the
normal SSM methodology was the combination of the multiple viewpoints into a single model. The
express intent was to combine the complete data set in this way to provide for generalization since the
selection of the practitioners was as comprehensive from an industry and functional perspective as
possible. However, with such an array of data the qualitative nature of the research is clearly subject to
review and consequently the validation stage was essential. From the limited amount of feed back
available it would seem that the modeling has been relatively successful. But relatively minor
modifications both in presentation and content will need to be implemented to concur with the criticism
and the model re-presented. At this stage, however, we feel that the research has been successful and
progress has been made towards the construction of a generic model.
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Appendix 1
System Functions

Theme

Subject

Detail

An Information security service desk

Attribute

Administer effectively

Administration

Well managed

Attribute

Administer efficiently

Administration

Business systems run cost effectively

Attribute

Administer efficiently

Cost

A good information flow

Attribute

Efficiency

Information

Timesaving

Attribute

Efficiency

Time

Toolset functions

Attribute

Functional requirements

General

Internet access

Attribute

Functional requirements

Internet

Must be capable of high levels of encryption

Attribute

Functional requirements

Protection

To be able to get a better result based on that specialization

Attribute

Objective

Efficiency

To produce information for management decisions

Attribute

Objective

Efficiency

Protection of data systems

Attribute

Objective

Protection

Evaluation and defending against threats

Attribute

Objective

Protection

The implementation of policy and practice.

Attribute

Objective

Strategic

Allow internal staff to concentrate on strategic goals.

Attribute

Objective

Strategic

Minimisation of risk.

Attribute

Objective

Strategic

Patch levels

Attribute

Robustness

Protection

Pro-activity towards new vulnerabilities

Attribute

Robustness

Vulnerability future

Hardened

Attribute

Robustness

Protection

Client authentication.

Function

Control access

Protection

Identity management and access management

Function

Control access

Protection

Monitoring of security breaches

Function

Maintain surveillance

Information

Capacity monitoring

Function

Maintain surveillance

Information

Network performance.

Function

Maintain surveillance

System monitoring

Vulnerability monitoring

Function

Maintain surveillance

Vulnerability current

System should assist in the classification of documents.

Function

Manage data

Data

Content management

Function

Manage data

Data

Classification of data for escalation.

Function

Manage data

Data

Normalisation of that data to a standard format.

Function

Manage data

Data

Spyware protection

Function

Prevent intrusion

Protection

Centeralised virus protection

Function

Prevent intrusion

Protection

Application authentication.

Function

Prevent intrusion

Protection

Perimeter security.

Function

Prevent intrusion

Security

Systems security.

Function

Prevent intrusion

Security

Provide review.

Function

Produce reports

Information

Audit.

Function

Produce reports

Information

Report on the knowledge of personnel

Function

Produce reports

Information

Report improvements on staff knowledge.

Function

Produce reports

Information

Analysis to weed out false positives.

Function

Record & Analyse

Information

Logging and analysis of Firewall, IDS, and event logs.

Function

Record & Analyse

Information

Log monitoring

Function

Record & Analyse

Information

Realtime analysis of InfoSec infrastructure.

Function

Record & Analyse

Protection

Adequate backup facilities and procedures.

Function

Self protect via backup

Integrity

Proactive testing of backup restores.

Function

Self protect via backup

Integrity

System Administration, meaning the function.

Funtion

Administer system

Administration

Capacity planning

TBD

Capacity
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